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Kierkegaard s Socratic Point ofView
Paul Muench
What our age needs...is not a new contribution to the 
system but a subjective thinker who relates himself 
to existing qua Christian just as Socrates related 
himself to existing qua human being (CUP2 77; Pap.
VI B 98, p. 62).'
—-Johannes Climacus
N o t lon g  before he died in 1855, Søren Kierkegaard com posed  a b r ie f essay 
entitled “M y Task” (M  340-347 ; SV 1  14, 3 5 0 -3 5 7 ).2 In this relatively n eg ­
lected  w ork he argues that i f  w e want to understand h im  and the activities 
in w h ich  he has been  engaged in C openhagen , then there is on ly  one  
instructive object o f  com parison: Socrates and the role he played as p h ilo ­
sophical gadfly in ancient Athens. In this paper I critically discuss this text 
and consider in particular Kierkegaards claim  that his refusal to call h im ­
self a Christian— in a con text w here it was the social norm  to do so— is 
m ethodologically  analogous to Socrates’ stance o f  ignorance.
I. The Moment, 10:“M yT ask”
W h en  Kierkegaard died on  N ovem b er 11, 1855, age 42, he left behind  
am ong his papers the finished manuscript for the tenth issue o f  his serial 
The Moment. This final issue includes a section, dated Septem ber 1, 1855, 
that is entitled “M y Task” and that turns out to be in effect Kierkegaard’s 
last p ronouncem ent upon  the various activities he has been  engaged in as 
a w riter and thinker since the com pletion  and defense o f  his dissertation.3 
It is thus also the last in a series o f  works w ith in  Kierkegaard’s corpus that 
(either entirely or in part) are explicit reflections about his m eth od ology  
and that often include remarks about h o w  to understand som e o f  his other  
individual works or h o w  to conceive o f  them  as a part o f  a larger p h ilo ­
sophical and religious undertaking. To take an analogy from  literary stud­
ies, just as there are works o f  literature and works o f  criticism , so can w e  
find w ith in  Kierkegaard’s corpus a num ber o f  works that prim arily seek to  
illum inate a certain subject matter or existential stance w h ile  also seeking
to have an existential im pact on  the reader; at the same tim e, there exists a 
second, smaller class o f  w ritings that serves a m ore critical, m ethodologica l 
function, offering us ways in w h ich  Kierkegaard thinks w e ought to  
approach the first class o f  w ritings together w ith  general remarks about the 
overall poin t o f  v iew  that he claims inform s his authorship and about the 
basic m eth od  that he em ploys.4 W h ile  m ost o f  these m eth odologica l texts 
have received a significant am ount o f  attention from  scholars (especially 
The Point o f View), the text w e are considering, “M y Task,” remains relative­
ly neglected .5 H aving spent several years reflecting about his authorship  
(and com posin g  a num ber o f  texts in  the process), Kierkegaard makes one  
last effort in “M y Task” to draw everything together for his reader and to  
present in as com pressed and distilled a m anner as possible the essence o f  
w hat he takes his task to have been . As a result, despite its neglect, this text 
is perhaps the best single docu m en t w e have for obtaining a basic picture 
o f  h ow  Kierkegaard conceives o f  his ow n  activities as a w riter and thinker.
O ver the space o f  just a few  pages Kierkegaard eloquently  sketches for 
us w hat he takes to be his contem porary situation, a situation w here the  
authentic practice o f  Christianity has alm ost ceased to exist w h ile  it never­
theless remains the cultural norm  for peop le (notably his fe llow  citizens o f  
C openhagen) to continue to conceive o f  them selves as Christians. O n  
Kierkegaard s view, there is a striking lack o f  fit b etw een  h o w  his con tem ­
poraries picture their lives and h ow  they actually live those lives: he con ­
tends that they self-deceptively think they are Christians w h ile  failing to  
put into practice the Christian ideal. In response to this situation  
Kierkegaard open ly  refuses to call h im self a Christian and at tim es even  
denies that he is a Christian: “I do not call m yself a Christian, do not say o f  
m yself that I am a C hristian .. ..It is altogether true: I am n ot a C hristian” 
(M  340, S V I  14, 350 , trans. m odified; M  3 4 2 -3 4 3 , S V i  14, 353). H e real­
izes that a person w h o  open ly  declares that she does not call h erself a Chris­
tian is in danger o f  sounding crazy in a society  w here it goes w ith ou t say­
ing that everyone is a Christian, especially som eon e like h im  w h o  has prin­
cipally devoted h im self to w ritin g  about w hat it is to be a Christian:
Yes, I w ell k n o w  that it alm ost sounds like a k ind  o f  lunacy in  this C hristian  
w orld— w here each and every o n e  is C hristian, w h ere  b ein g  a C hristian  is 
som eth in g  that everyone naturally is— that there is so m eo n e  w h o  says o f  
him self, “ I do n ot call m y self a C hristian,” and so m eo n e  w h o m  C hristian i­
ty occup ies to  the degree to w h ich  it occup ies m e (M  340; S V I  14, 3 5 0 -  
351 [italics m ine]).
In response to such a claim, those w h o  have a general fam iliarity w ith  
Kierkegaards w ritings may feel the strong desire to object: Isn’t this a 
strange th ing for Kierkegaard o f  all p eop le to say? D o n ’t w e k n ow  he is a 
Christian, an exem plary Christian w h o  has had a significant im pact on  th e­
ology, on  philosophy and on  countless other fields and w h ose w ritings 
remain personally m ovin g  to som e, personally repugnant to others, pre­
cisely for their very Christian orientation and emphasis? O n e m ight even  
feel like excla im in g,“If he isn’t a Christian w h o  is?!” Yet, at least in  this text, 
Kierkegaard declares “ I am not a Christian” and insists that “anyone w h o  
wants to understand [his] totally distinct task must train himself to be able to  
fix his attention on  this” very phrase and the fact that he, Kierkegaard, 
“continually” repeats it (M  340; SV 1  1 4 ,3 5 0  [italics m ine; tran. m odified]).
In fact, Kierkegaard m ight n ot be all that surprised by expressions o f  
puzzlem ent o f  this sort from  those w h o  take them selves to be familiar w ith  
his texts. T h ou gh  he claims in “M y Task” that his authorship was “at the 
outset stam ped‘the single individual— I am not a Christian,’ ” this is the first 
tim e he has open ly  avowed that this is his position  (M  344; S V 1  14, 3 5 4 ).6 
Kierkegaard suggests that those w h o  think they k n ow  he is a Christian (and 
w hat is supposed to fo llow  from  this) are almost certain to m isunderstand  
him , for he open ly  rejects the idea that there is anything analogous in the 
entire history o f  Christianity to the stance he adopts and the task he pur­
sues. H e contends that this is “the first tim e in ‘C hristend om ’ ” that anyone 
has approached things in this particular manner:
T h e p o in t o f  v ie w  I have exh ib ited  and am  ex h ib itin g  is o f  such a d istinc­
tive nature that in  e ig h teen  hundred years o f  C h risten d om  there is quite lit­
erally n o th in g  analogous, n o th in g  com parable that I have to appeal to .T hus, 
in  the face o f  e ig h teen  hundred years, I stand quite literally a lone (M  3 4 4 ,
S V i  14, 355; M  3 4 0 -3 4 1 , S V 1  14, 3 5 1 -3 5 2 , trans. m o d ified ).7
As Kierkegaard clearly cannot m ean by this claim  that he is the first person  
ever to declare that he is not a Christian (since this is som ething atheists 
and p eop le w h o  practice other religions do as a matter o f  course), he must 
attach a special significance to the fact that he utters this phrase in  a co n ­
text w here it has b ecom e the n orm  for peop le to declare them selves to be 
Christians and even to con ceive o f  them selves as Christians w h ile  living  
lives that in  no way reflect these supposed com m itm ents.
Kierkegaard’s claim that there is no one analogous to h im  in eighteen  
hundred years o f  Christianity is not the only thing, however, that is extraor­
dinary about this passage. Im m ediately after he claims that he stands alone 
in C hristendom , Kierkegaard makes the perhaps even m ore remarkable 
claim that there does exist one person prior to h im  w h ose activity is analo­
gous: “T h e only analogy I have before m e is Socrates; m y task is a Socratic 
task, to audit the definition o f  what it is to be a Christian” (M  341; S V t  14, 
352). That is, Kierkegaard claims that Socrates, a non-C hristian pagan 
philosopher, is his one true predecessor, that Socrates’ philosophical activity 
is the only thing analogous to his activity as a writer and thinker, such that 
w e should conceive o f  his task— supposedly unique w ith in  Christianity— as 
a Socratic task. I think this is a remarkable claim. I f  Socrates really provides 
the only analogy to Kierkegaard and i f  Kierkegaard’s task truly is as thor­
oughly Socratic as he seems to be suggesting, then w e may be in  the pres­
ence here o f  a thought that ultim ately has the potential to revolutionize the 
very way w e think about Kierkegaard and h ow  w e approach his texts.
II. Kierkegaard’s Socratic Stance: “I am N o t  a Christian”
T h e idea that Kierkegaard is in  som e sense a Socratic figure is b ound  to 
strike m ost scholars o f  Kierkegaard as obvious. A ny random  selection  o f  
secondary literature is certain to include the occasional appeal to 
Kierkegaard’s lifelong interest in Socrates and interpretations abound that 
seek to shore up w hatever is being  argued for w ith  the thought that, after 
all, Kierkegaard m od eled  h im self on  Socrates, had a penchant for irony and 
indirection, etc., etc. B ut w h ile  it w ou ld  be surprising to discover som eone  
w h o  claim ed to be familiar w ith  Kierkegaard’s w ritings and yet w h o  had 
no idea that Socrates was an im portant figure for him , w e still lack a 
detailed, in -depth  treatm ent o f  the matter. This is not to say that there do  
not exist any studies o f  Kierkegaard’s con cep tion  o f  Socrates or any help ­
ful accounts o f  w hat m ight be called Kierkegaard’s Socratic m ethod. B ut 
these are surprisingly few  in num ber.8 O n e reason I think “M y Task” is a 
useful place to start is that this text is fairly com pressed and schem atic in  
nature. Kierkegaard is here not so m uch trying to put a Socratic m eth od  
into practice as to invite us to take up a poin t o f  v iew  that he thinks makes 
intelligible m any o f  the activities he has b een  engaged in as a w riter and 
thinker since the publication o f  his dissertation. T his m eans that on ce the 
poin t o f  v iew  at issue b ecom es clear w e w ill have to turn to other parts o f  
Kierkegaard’s corpus i f  w e want to obtain a m ore detailed grasp o f  h o w  his 
task actually gets im plem ented  in practice and w hat it is m ore specifically 
about this task that he thinks makes it quintessential^  Socratic.9
L ets consider further Kierkegaards com parison o f  h im self to Socrates in  
“M y Task.” I want to make clear up front that in m y v iew  the single m ost 
im portant text for Kierkegaards thinking about Socrates is P lato’s Apology.10 
This is a text to w h ich  he returns again and again in his w ritings about 
Socrates and w h ich  em bodies for h im  the Socratic ideal: a life that sim ul­
taneously is directed at the cultivation o f  the self together w ith  the aim  o f  
engaging o n e ’s fe llow  citizens and getting them  to exam ine them selves 
m ore closely  In the case o f  “M y Task,” w here w e find on e o f  Kierkegaard’s 
m ost mature portraits o f  Socrates, w e are invited to com pare Kierkegaard’s 
situation and the events that have unfolded in his life to the drama o f  
Socrates’ life as it is recounted  by h im  in the Apology.11 R ecall that a signif­
icant portion  o f  Socrates’ defense speech consists o f  a m ore general account 
o f  h ow  he cam e to practice philosophy and w h y  he thinks such a life is 
w orth pursuing, together w ith  his explanation o f  w h y  so m any peop le have 
been  slandering h im  over the years. Let m e briefly rem ind you  o f  the m ain  
cast o f  characters w h o  make an appearance in Socrates’ account o f  his life: 
(1) the Sophists, professional teachers and som etim es rivals o f  Socrates w ith  
w h o m  he is often confused by the general public;12 (2) the god, w h o  m ani­
fests h im self through the oracle at D elp h i and perhaps through the related 
p h en om en on  o f  Socrates’ daimonion or divine sign;13 (3) the broader group  
o f  those reputed to be wise (represented by the politicians, the poets and the 
craftsmen) w ith  w h o m  Socrates converses, along w ith  the public at large 
w h ich  often listens to their discussions;14 (4) the young Athenian men w h o  
fo llow  Socrates around and w h o  enjoy listening to h im  question those  
reputed to be w ise;15 and (5) Socrates him self, w h o  claims that the on ly  sense 
in w h ich  he is w ise is that he “do[es] not think [he] know[s] w hat [he] 
do[es] not know,” and w h o  believes that the god  ordered h im  to “live the 
life o f  a philosopher, to exam ine [himself] and others,” thereby serving as a 
kind o f  gadfly w h o  awakens p eop le from  their ethical slum bers.16 Socrates 
offers this account o f  his life as a part o f  the defense speech he delivers 
before the jury. I f  w e leave aside the character o f  M eletus and Socrates’ 
other im m ediate accusers, there exist w ith in  the larger dramatic con text o f  
Socrates’ defense tw o other significant characters w orth  m entioning: (6) 
Socrates'jury, a selection  o f  his Athenian peers w h ich  also serves as a kind o f  
literary analogue for the readers of Plato's text, w h o  them selves are invited to  
arrive at their ow n  ju d gm en t about Socrates’ guilt or in n ocen ce;17 and (7) 
Plato, w h o  is represented as on e o f  the you ng m en in attendance at 
Socrates’ trial and w h o , in turn, is also the w riter and thinker w h o  has co m ­
posed the text in question .18
I want to suggest that Kierkegaard m odels w hat he is doin g  in “M y  
Task”— speaking m ore generally about his m eth od  and overall approach—  
on  the account that Socrates develops in the Apology and that he invites us 
to treat his contem porary situation as a m odern  analogue to the on e faced  
by Socrates in Athens. As the text unfolds and he develops his claim  that 
Socrates provides his on ly  analogy, Kierkegaard proceeds to single out a 
variety o f  characters each o f  w h o m  corresponds to on e o f  the major char­
acters in the Socratic drama (the Sophists, the god, those reputed to be w ise  
along w ith  the w ider public, the you n g  Athenian m en  w h o  fo llow  Socrates, 
Socrates him self, Socrates’ jury, P lato’s readers and P lato).19 Sim plifying a 
bit, the m ain characters discussed by Kierkegaard are the follow ing: (1) the 
pastors and theologians, w h o  make a profession o f  proclaim ing w hat it is to  
be a Christian and w h o m  Kierkegaard calls “sophists” ; (2) the public, w h o  
conceive o f  them selves as Christians but w h o  do n ot actually live in accord  
w ith  the Christian ideal; (3) Kierkegaard qua Socratic figure, w h o  denies he is 
a Christian and w h o  helps to make his fe llow  citizens aware o f  a deeper 
sense in w h ich  they are not Christians (since they think they are Christians 
w h en  they are not); (4) the Christian God of Love, w h o m  Kierkegaard 
believes has singled h im  out to be the gadfly o f  C openhagen; (5) 
Kierkegaard's readers, individual m em bers o f  the public w h o  are isolated as 
individuals by Kierkegaard’s texts and w h o m  he seeks to engage as inter­
locutors; and (6) Kierkegaard qua writer and critic, w h o  decides h o w  to dram­
atize the Socratic engagem ent o f  his audience and w h o  offers interpretive 
tools for understanding his texts.
L et’s start w ith  the pastors and theologians and the larger public. 
Kierkegaard argues that the cultural p h en om en on  presenting itself as 
Christianity— w hat he calls “C hristend om ” [Christenhed]— is perm eated by 
a kind o f  sophistry. In particular, he com pares the pastors and theologians 
o f  his day to the Sophists20 battled by Socrates:
“ C h risten d o m ” lies in  an abyss o f  sophistry that is m uch , m u ch  w orse than  
w h e n  the Sophists flourished  in  G reece .T h ose leg io n s o f  pastors and C hris­
tian assistant professors are all so p h ists ... .w h o  by falsifying the d efin ition  o f  
C hristian have, for the sake o f  the business, gained  m illions and m illions o f  
Christians (M 3 4 1 , S V 1  14, 3 5 2 , trans. m odified; M  3 4 0 , S V 1  14, 3 5 1 ) .21
If the pastors and theologians correspond to the professional teachers o f  
virtue in Socrates’ day, then the larger Christian public corresponds m ore 
broadly to those in Athens w h o  think they k n ow  w hat virtue is w h en  they
do not. O n e o f  Kierkegaard s m ain polem ics is against the official Danish  
church and its representatives, the pastors and theologians. H e  contends 
that the church has b ecom e a business (w hose m ain goal, then, is to make 
m on ey  and to perpetuate itself as an institution), and thus a b ody that out 
o f  self-interest obscures the true Christian message, em ploying a watered- 
dow n version in order for the sake o f  profits to m axim ize the total num ber  
o f  Christians.22 A t the same tim e Kierkegaard also conceives o f  the public 
itself as a distinct force to be reckoned w ith , as an abstract crowd or m ob  
w h ose existence is predicated on  the failure o f  peop le to cultivate and 
maintain them selves qua individuals. H e invites us to im agine the con tem ­
porary situation o f  C hristendom  to consist o f  hordes o f  people, all running  
around calling them selves Christians and con ceiv in g  o f  them selves as 
Christians, often  under the direct influence and guidance o f  the pastors and 
theologians, w h ile  n ext to no  on e is actually living a true, authentic C hris­
tian life. In this way he upholds a distinction b etw een  the pastors and th e­
ologians (sophists proper), w h o  make a living advocating w hat it is to be a 
Christian, and the larger population, w h o  m ore generally think they are 
Christians w h en  they are not and w h o m  Kierkegaard generically calls “the 
others” [de Andre].23
Kierkegaard casts h im self in  the role o f  Socrates and, accordingly, depicts 
him self as som eon e w h o  both  seeks to reform  the larger public and w h o  
com bats the corrupting influence o f  the pastors and theologians. B y  m ak­
ing such pronouncem ents about his contem porary situation and by pre­
senting h im self as som eon e w h o  is capable o f  observing such patterns o f  
behavior and even o f  d iagnosing w hat can lead to such a state o f  things, 
Kierkegaard is aware that he m ight appear to be setting h im self up as an 
extraordinary Christian. B ut he denies that he is any such thing and sug­
gests that his refusal to call h im self a Christian at all partly helps to b lock  
such attributions:
I d o  n o t call m y self a C hristian. T hat this is very awkward for the sophists I
understand very w ell, and I understand very w ell that they  w o u ld  m uch
prefer that w ith  kettledrum s and trum pets I procla im ed m y self to  be the
o n ly  true C hristian  (M  3 4 1 -3 4 2 ; S V i  14, 352 , trans. m od ified ).
R ecall that Kierkegaard is w ell aware that his refusal to call h im self a Chris­
tian is bound  to strike his contem poraries as odd or even crazy against the 
backdrop o f  a society w here everyone as a matter o f  course calls herself a 
Christian. D esp ite this appearance o f  bizarreness, Kierkegaard contends
that there are tw o significant reasons w h y  he continues to assert this about 
him self. First, he ties his refusal to call h im self a Christian, or in  any way to  
m odify this statem ent, to his desire to m aintain a proper relationship w ith  
an om n ipoten t being, a b eing  he later characterizes as the Christian “G od  
o f  L ove” :
I neither can, nor w ill, nor dare change m y statem ent: o therw ise  perhaps 
another change w o u ld  take p lace— that the pow er, an o m n ip o ten ce  
[Almagt] that especially uses m y pow erlessness [Afmagt], w o u ld  w ash his 
hands o f  m e and let m e go  m y o w n  w ay (M  3 4 5 , S V 1  1 4 ,3 5 6 ;  M  34 0 , S V 1  
14, 35 1 , trans. m od ified ).24
A t the same tim e, Kierkegaard ties his stance o f  on e w h o  does not call h im ­
self a Christian to an ability to make his contem poraries (“the others”) 
aware o f  an even deeper sense in w h ich  he claims that they are not Chris­
tians:
I am  n o t a C hristian— and unfortunately  I can m ake it m anifest that the  
others are n o t either— in deed , even  less than I, since they  imagine th em ­
selves to  be that [de indbilde sig at vcere det], or they falsely ascribe to  th em ­
selves that they  are that ( M 340; S V 1  1 4 ,3 5 1  [italics m ine; tran. m o d ified ]).25
I do n o t call m y self a C hristian  (keep ing the ideal free), but I can m ake it 
m anifest that the others are that even  less (M  3 4 1 ; S  V I  14, 352).
H e seem s to think that adopting a p osition  o f  on e w h o  refuses to call h im ­
self a Christian makes h im  an especially tenacious interlocutor, som eone  
w h o m  his contem poraries w ill not be able to shake o ff  very easily:
Just because I do n o t call m y self a C hristian  it is im possib le to  get rid o f  m e, 
having as I do the co n fo u n d ed  characteristic that I can m ake it m anifest—  
also by means o f  n o t calling m y self a C hristian— that the others are that even  
less (M  342; S V 1  14, 3 5 2 -3 5 3  [italics m ine; tran. m od ified ]).
Kierkegaard conceives his task, then, to have a tw o -fo ld  structure. B y  
denying that he is a Christian in the face o f  his contem poraries’ w on t to  
assert the opposite, he claims to be develop ing  and u ph old in g  som e kind  
o f  religious relationship to a divine b ein g  w h ile  also acquiring a pow erful 
m eans o f  awakening his contem poraries and m aking th em  aware o f  the
lack o f  fit b etw een  h o w  they con ceive o f  their lives and h o w  they actual­
ly live th em .26
III. Socratic Ignorance
In the process o f  sketching his contem porary situation and characterizing 
both  the Sophist-like attributes o f  the pastors and theologians and the m ore 
general condition  o f  his contem poraries (w ho, he claims, think they are 
Christians w h en  they are not), Kierkegaard repeatedly invokes Socrates, 
especially in order to throw further light on  his characterization o f  h im self  
as a Socratic figure. H e suggests that Socrates’ task in A thens has the same 
tw o-fo ld  structure as his task: Socrates is both  a gadfly to his con tem p o ­
raries and som eon e w h o  holds that his life as a philosopher is an expression  
o f  his devotion  to the god. Let’s consider the im age o f  the gadfly first. 
Socrates’ use o f  this im age in the Apology is tied to the idea o f  his fe llow  cit­
izens’ being  in som e sense asleep and therefore in n eed  o f  b eing  awakened. 
H e compares their con d ition  to that o f  a sluggish but noble horse w h o  can 
only be stirred into life by the sting o f  a fly. B ut just as it is not u n com m on  
for horses to kill the flies that sting them  (with the quick snap o f  their tails), 
Socrates also notes that there is a certain danger involved in his b eing a gad- 
fly:
You m ight easily be annoyed  w ith  m e as p eop le  are w h e n  they  are aroused  
from  a doze, and strike ou t at m e; i f  con v in ced  by A nytus you  cou ld  easily 
kill m e, and then  yo u  cou ld  sleep o n  for the rest o f  your days, unless the  
god , in  his care for you , sent you  so m eo n e  else.27
Kierkegaard ties Socrates’ ability to awaken his fe llow  citizens to his stance 
o f  ignorance,28 and invites us to com pare this stance w ith  his ow n  stance 
o f  refusing to call h im self a Christian. H e contends that Socrates’ ig n o ­
rance b oth  effectively distinguishes h im  from  the Sophists (w h o profess to  
be know ledgeable about virtue and the like and w h o  are w illin g  to teach  
this to others for a fee) w h ile  also serving as a m eans for m aking his fel­
low  citizens aware o f  a different k ind o f  ignorance that they them selves 
possess:
O  Socrates! I f  w ith  kettledrum s and trum pets y ou  had procla im ed y ou rse lf  
to  be the o n e  w h o  k n ew  the m ost, the Sophists w o u ld  so o n  have b een  fin ­
ished  w ith  you . N o , y ou  w ere the ignorant one [den Uvidende]; but in  addition  
you  had the co n fo u n d ed  characteristic that you  cou ld  m ake it m anifest (also
by m eans o f  b e in g  y o u rse lf the ignorant one) that the others k n ew  even  less 
than y o u — they did n o t even  k n o w  that they w ere ignorant (M  342; S V t  
14, 3 5 3 , italics m ine; trans. m odified).
B y likening his stance o f  som eon e w h o  refuses to call h im self a Christian  
to Socrates’ position , Kierkegaard suggests that he shares w ith  Socrates the 
ability to make p eop le aware o f  a m ore sham eful or disgraceful form  o f  
ignorance (cf. A p. 29b), an ignorance that can on ly  be counteracted  
through a greater attention to and cultivation o f  the self. T h e c h ie f result o f  
interacting w ith  either a Socrates or a Kierkegaard is that an interlocutor  
com es to see that she has been  self-com placent, th inking she know s things 
she is not able to defend under exam ination or th inking she lives a certain 
way that does not in fact square w ith  her actual life. To be in such a con d i­
tion  is characterized by self-neglect and a lack o f  true intellectual curiosi­
ty, for i f  on e thinks on e is liv ing as on e im agines then no  deeper self-exam ­
ination is deem ed  necessary, and i f  on e thinks on e know s all about a sub­
ject then on e feels no n eed  to lo o k  into it in  a m ore searching way. W h ile  
Socrates’ concern  w ith  w hat a person know s m ight on  the face o f  it seem  
to be o f  a different order than Kierkegaard’s concern  w ith  w h eth er a per­
son lives as a Christian, the principal focus o f  both  o f  them  is w hat w e  
m ight call the practical sphere o f  hum an life, the sphere o f  ethics and reli­
g ion , w here an individual’s grasp o f  a given ethical or religious con cept is 
inherently tied to w hether or not it plays an appropriate role in the life she 
leads.29 Like Socrates, Kierkegaard focuses in  particular on  the tendency  
p eople have to lose track o f  the fundam ental con n ection  b etw een  k n ow ­
ing w hat virtue is or w hat it is to be a Christian and actually living a vir­
tuous life or living an authentic Christian life.30
T h e dangers associated w ith  Socrates’ b eing  a gadfly include the ten ­
dency o f  other p eop le to grow  angry w ith  h im  as w ell as an unw illingness  
to take h im  at his word w h en  he claims that he h im self is ignorant about 
w hat he can show  that the others on ly  think they know. In the Apology he 
says that it is not u n com m on  for his interlocutors to grow  angry in  
response to having b een  refuted by h im  and for them  and the larger audi­
ence to assume that he must know, despite his claims o f  ignorance, w hat he 
has show n that they do not know:
As a result o f  this investigation , g en tlem en  o f  the jury, I acquired m uch  
unpopularity, o f  a k ind  that is hard to deal w ith  and is a heavy burden; m any  
slanders cam e from  these p eo p le  and a reputation  for w isd o m , for in  each
case the bystanders th o u g h t that I m y self possessed  the w isd o m  that I 
proved that m y in terlocu tor did n ot have.31
T h e characteristic ways p eop le have o f  responding to Socrates’ profession  
o f  ignorance have also, according to Kierkegaard, applied w ith  respect to  
his denial that he is a Christian. H e claims that he often faces the same kind  
o f  anger, together w ith  a corresponding presum ption about his ow n  C hris­
tian status. B ut he is quick to deny that it in any way follow s from  his hav­
ing an ability to make others aware that they are not Christians that he 
h im self is a Christian:
B u t as it w en t w ith  y o u  [Socrates] (according to w hat y o u  say in  your  
“defense,” as yo u  ironically  en o u g h  have called the cru d est satire o n  a c o n ­
tem porary age)— nam ely  that y ou  m ade m any en em ies for you rse lf by  
m aking it m anifest that the others w ere ignorant and that the others held  a 
grudge against y ou  o u t o f  en vy  since they assum ed that y o u  y o u rse lf m ust 
be w hat you  cou ld  sh o w  that they w ere n ot— so has it also g o n e  w ith  m e. 
T hat I can m ake it m anifest that the others are even  less C hristian  than I 
has g iven  rise to  in d ignation  against m e; I w h o  nevertheless am  so engaged  
w ith  C hristianity that I truly perceive and ack n ow led ge that I am  n o t a 
Christian. S o m e w ant to foist o n  m e that m y saying that I am  n o t a C hris­
tian is o n ly  a h idd en  form  o f  pride, that I presum ably m ust be w hat I can  
sh ow  that the others are n ot. B u t this is a m isunderstanding; it is a ltogeth ­
er true: I am  n o t a C hristian. A nd  it is rash to con clu d e from  the fact that I 
can sh o w  that the others are n o t Christians that therefore I m y se lf  m ust be  
on e, just as rash as to  con clud e, for exam ple, that so m eo n e  w h o  is o n e -  
fourth  o f  a fo o t taller than o ther p eo p le  is, ergo, tw elve feet tall (M  3 4 2 -  
343; S V 1  14, 3 5 3 , trans. m odified).
Part o f  the difficulty in  taking seriously Socrates’ ignorance or 
Kierkegaard’s denial that he is a Christian is an unw illingness to accept the 
idea that som eon e in that cond ition  could  nevertheless be a skilled diag­
nostician and able conversation partner. W e find it hard to believe that 
Socrates cou ld  understand his interlocutors as w ell as he seem s to be able 
to (seem ingly being  acquainted w ith  all the different form s that their ig n o ­
rance can take) w h ile  rem aining h im self ignorant about the subject in  ques­
tion. Similarly, cou ld  Kierkegaard really be as g ood  at depicting the various 
ways that a person can fall short o f  b eing a Christian w h ile  contin uin g  to 
think she is a Christian i f  he were not h im self that very thing? B ut this is
to underestim ate the pow er o f  self-know ledge. For Socrates and 
Kierkegaard to  be go o d  at diagnosing and treating different species o f  that 
m ore disgraceful kind o f  ignorance w hat is required first and forem ost is 
that they have b ecom e acquainted in their ow n  case w ith  the p h en om en on  
at issue, the tendency o f  a person to a kind o f  self-satisfaction w here she 
im agines she know s m ore than she does. This tendency is a con d ition  she 
is prone to that she needs to discover and— through self-exam ination and 
self-scrutiny— learn to regulate and control. W h ile  it is clearly true that a 
Socrates or a Kierkegaard w ill not m ake an effective conversation partner 
i f  he cannot discuss w ith  som e precision w hatever it is he suspects that his 
interlocutor only thinks she know s, the ch ie f qualification is that he be per­
sonally acquainted w ith  the activity o f  forever b ein g  on  the look ou t for any 
such tendency in his ow n  case. In fact, he m ust h im self be an accom plished  
master o f  this activity (he must uphold  the D elp h ic  injunction  to k now  
thyself) i f  he is to be able to help others to m ake similar discoveries about 
them selves and to introduce them  into the rigors o f  a life that seeks to avoid  
that m ore disgraceful kind o f  ignorance in all its various m anifestations.
I suspect that a further reason that w e may find it difficult to take seri­
ously Socrates’ ignorance is that it does not seem  to sit w ell w ith  our idea 
o f  h im  as a philosopher. W h ile  w e may certainly applaud the m anner in  
w h ich  he helps others to overcom e their m ore disgraceful con d ition  o f  
ignorance, the fact remains that Socrates still seem s to fall short o f  a certain  
philosophical ideal. T h e im age w e get o f  h im  in m any o f  P lato’s dialogues 
is o f  som eon e w h o  is always approaching k now ledge, perhaps gaining  
greater and greater con viction  about w hat he holds to be the case but never 
actually arriving at know ledge itself.32 This picture o f  Socrates (upheld both  
by Plato and A ristotle and m ost o f  the philosophical tradition since them , 
including H egel and the early Kierkegaard o f  The Concept o f Irony) tends to  
conceptualize his philosophical activity as b eing  on ly  a part o f  a larger 
enterprise, as itself incom p lete or prelim inary in nature.33 W h ile  Socrates’ 
m eth od  o f  engaging his interlocutors may help cleanse them  o f  m iscon ­
ceptions or rem ove a certain kind o f  self-satisfaction that stands in  the way 
o f  a proper philosophical engagem ent o f  a given  topic, on ce Socrates has 
done w hat he does w ell (so the story goes) then other m ethods are required 
i f  w e are actually to gain w hat he has show n his interlocutors to lack. 
T h ou gh  Kierkegaard seem s to endorse a version o f  this picture in his dis­
sertation, as his con cep tion  o f  Socrates develops in  his later w ritings he 
m ore and m ore vehem ently  com es to reject this picture and instead m ain­
tains that Socrates’ philosophical activity is n ot a m ere precursor to som e­
th ing else but itself the hum an ideal (the best ethical and religious life avail­
able outside o f  Christianity). Socrates’ life as a philosopher is thus held by 
Kierkegaard to be hum anly com plete, and ought in his v iew  to make a 
claim  on  us and to serve as a m od el that w e can em ulate in  our ow n  lives. 
Socrates’ activity o f  exam ining and refuting, forever on  the look ou t for fur­
ther instances o f  a person’s th inking she know s w hat she does not, becom es  
a life-lon g , ever vigilant task that he invites each o f  us to take part in; a task 
that a person w ill never finish, for the m om en t she begins to im agine that 
she has finished w ith  such self-exam ination and self-scrutiny is the very  
m om en t w h en  she may begin  to think she know s som ething she does n o t.34
To m otivate this picture o f  Socrates, Kierkegaard appeals to the religious 
significance that Socrates attaches to his activity as a gadfly in  Athens. In the 
face o f  the reputation for w isd om  that he has acquired over the years, 
Socrates upholds his stance o f  ignorance and insists that it really is the case 
that he lacks know ledge o f  the very things he tests others about. B ut this 
w ou ld  then seem  to leave us exactly w here Socrates found h im self upon  
first hearing o f  the oracle’s claim  that no one was wiser.35 H o w  can it truly 
be the case that Socrates is both  ignorant (as he insists) and the wisest 
am ong hum an beings? R ecall that in  the Apology Socrates offers us a way  
out o f  this apparent b ind and, in the process, exhibits the very m odesty that 
is often  associated w ith  his stance o f  ignorance:
W hat is probable, g en tlem en , is that in  fact the g o d  is w ise  and that his orac­
ular response m eant that hum an w isd o m  is w orth  little or n oth in g , and that 
w h e n  he says this m an, Socrates, he is u sing m y nam e as an exam ple, as i f  
he said: “T his m an a m on g  you , m ortals, is w isest w h o , like Socrates, under­
stands that his w isd o m  is w orthless.”36
T he claim  that hum an w isd om  is w orth  “little or n o th in g” can strike p eo ­
ple in quite different ways. In the traditional picture o f  Socrates (in w h ich  
he battles the Sophists, destroying sophistry to make room  for philosophy, 
though  h im self rem aining only a preliminary step in its develop m en t), one  
m ight be inclined  to restrict this claim  about hum an w isd om  to p re-ph ilo- 
sophical form s o f  w isdom . As philosophy develops and becom es ever m ore 
sophisticated, a w isd om  b ecom es possible that no longer is “little or n oth ­
in g ” but rather approaches the w isd om  Socrates reserves for the god. In his 
later writings on  Socrates Kierkegaard rejects this reading and instead takes 
it to be the case that Socrates means to draw a strict line between the hum an  
and the divine, and to ground claims o f  hum an w isd om  in an individual’s
ability to remain aware o f  that d istinction.37 O n  this picture the difference 
betw een  a w ise hum an b eing and an ignorant on e is that the w ise person  
remains aware o f  her ignorance in relation to the w isd om  o f  the god; the 
task is to develop on ese lf w h ile  m aintaining this awareness, thereby at the 
same tim e developing a proper relationship to the god. For Kierkegaard, 
then, Socrates is to be taken at his w ord w h en  he says that hum an w isd om  
is w orth  little or noth ing. H e does not think that Socrates’ practice o f  phi­
losophy is m eant to begin  w ith  this little or n oth in g  and increm entally try 
to bring it as close as possible to w hat on ly  the god  truly possesses. Rather, 
it is to engage in a task o f  self-exam ination and self-scrutiny o f  the sort that 
helps a person to  fortify herself against the ever prevalent tendency to think  
she know s things she does not; that is, against the tendency to lose track o f  
the difference betw een  the hum an and the divine. For Kierkegaard, 
Socrates’life as a philosopher em bodies a rigorous task o f  ethical self-exam ­
ination that expresses in  its hum an m odesty a deeply religious com m it­
m ent. Socrates’ ignorance is the poin t from  w h ich  a person shall not be  
m oved, not the poin t from w h ich  a better, m ore developed  philosophy can 
b egin  to em erge.38
As Kierkegaard develops the parallel b etw een  h im self and Socrates, it 
b ecom es clear just h o w  significant Socrates is for h im  personally. O n e o f  
the ways this manifests itself stems from  his claim  that he stands alone w ith ­
in  the Christian tradition. W h ile  underlining yet again that he thinks that 
“in C h ristendom ’s eighteen  hundred years there is absolutely noth in g  
comparable, n oth in g  analogous to [his] task,” he notes that there are certain 
burdens associated w ith  occupying such a unique position:
I k n o w  w hat it has cost, w hat I have suffered, w h ich  can be expressed by a 
single line: I was never like the others [de Andre]. A h, o f  all the torm ents in  
youth fu l days, the m ost dreadful, the m ost intense: n o t to  be like the o th ­
ers, never to live any day w ith o u t painfully b e in g  rem inded  that o n e  is n o t  
like the others, never to be able to  run w ith  the crow d, the desire and the  
jo y  o f  you th , never free to be able to abandon on eself, always, as so o n  as o n e  
w o u ld  risk it, to  be painfully rem inded  o f  the chain, the segregation  o f  sin ­
gularity that, to  the p o in t o f  despair, painfully  separates a p erson  from
everyth ing that is called hum an  life and cheerfulness and gladness__ W ith
the years, this pain does decrease m ore and m ore; for as o n e  b eco m es m ore  
and m ore spiritually d eveloped  [Aand], it is n o  lo n ger painful that o n e  is n o t  
like the others. To be spiritually d evelop ed  is precisely: n o t to  be like the  
others (M  344; S V t 14, 3 5 5 , trans. m odified).
W ith  such real isolation and heartfelt loneliness in view, Kierkegaard s claim  
that Socrates occup ied  an analogous position  becom es all the m ore  
poignant since this in effect ensures that there is at least on e person w h o  
w ou ld  be in  a p osition  to understand the difficulties o f  his task. Early on  in  
“M y Task,” just after he claims that Socrates provides his on ly  analogy, 
Kierkegaard turns and open ly  addresses him:
You, an tiquity’s n ob le sim ple soul, y ou  the o n ly  human being I adm iringly  
ack n ow led ge as a thinker: there is o n ly  a little preserved about yo u , o f  all 
p eo p le  the o n ly  true m artyr o f  intellectuality, ju st as great qua character as 
qua thinker; but h o w  ex ceed in g ly  m u ch  this little is! H o w  I lo n g , far from  
those battalions o f  thinkers that “ C h risten d o m ” places in  the field  under the  
nam e o f  C hristian th in k ers ... h o w  I lo n g  to  be able to  speak— if  o n ly  for 
h alf an hour— w ith  you! (M  341; S V t  14, 3 52 , trans. m odified)
In this way Socrates b ecom es a kind o f  inner com panion  for Kierkegaard, 
som eone to w h o m  he can confide and w h ose exam ple he can draw upon  
in his darker, lonelier m om ents, or in those m om ents perhaps w h en  he feels 
least understood by his contem poraries.39
IV. Kierkegaard as W riter and Thinker
In addition to characterizing his contem porary situation and his response 
to that situation in terms o f  the four m ain figures w e have been  discussing 
thus far (the pastors and theologians, the public, the Christian G od  o f  Love, 
and h im self qua Socratic figure), Kierkegaard makes clear in  “M y Task” that 
he also conceives o f  h im self as playing a role analogous to that o f  Plato the 
writer and thinker. Just as Kierkegaard often depicts (and takes part in) 
Socratic exchanges w ith in  his texts, so also in his capacity as a w riter does 
he frequently engage in a conversation w ith  the individual readers o f  these 
texts, usually addressing them  in the singular as “m y dear reader” (M  345; 
S V t  14, 356). T h ou gh  the individual reader is frequently invited by 
Kierkegaard to apply w hat has b een  enacted in a given w ork to her ow n  
life (as a reader o f  on e o f  Plato s dialogues m ight com e to exam ine herself 
m ore closely in the light o f  certain exchanges that Plato has portrayed 
betw een  Socrates and a given interlocutor), there are also cases w ith in  
Kierkegaards corpus w here he engages the reader qua reader, seeking to  
instruct her on  h o w  to read his texts. Kierkegaard’s activity in this case is 
akin to Socrates’ attem pt to inform  his jury about his practice as a p h iloso ­
pher, and seeks to provide his reader w ith  a m ore general understanding o f  
his overall po in t o f  v iew  and h ow  he, the w riter and thinker, thinks that his 
books should be read. O bviously the m ere fact that Kierkegaard claims that 
his books m ean thus and so, or that they ou ght to be read in the light o f  
such and such, etc., does n ot guarantee that he is right.40 T h e p ro o f lies in  
h o w  illum inating w e find such orienting remarks to be. D o  they reveal to  
us ways o f  approaching his texts that make those texts interesting to read, 
and do they help us to discern patterns o f  argum ent and literary nuance 
that w e otherw ise m ight not properly appreciate?
T h e m ain aim  o f  “M y Task” is to provide us w ith  a p o in t o f  v iew  from  
w h ich , according to Kierkegaard, his activities as a w riter and thinker 
b ecom e intelligib le. As should have b ecom e clear by n o w  that p oin t o f  
v iew  m ight be called a Socratic p oin t o f  view , and it remains Kierkegaard’s 
c h ie f con ten tion  that Socrates is the on e individual prior to h im  w h ose  
activity sheds any light on  his task. B y  m aking such p ronouncem ents  
Kierkegaard in effect presents h im self as the best qualified person to offer 
a critical account o f  his authorship, and suggests that i f  you  want to  
b ecom e a go o d  reader o f  his texts then  you  should lo o k  to h im  and 
remarks o f  this sort for help.41 H is claim  to be the “on e single person w h o  
is qualified to give a true critique o f  [his] w ork ” partly rests on  his b e lie f  
that n on e o f  his contem poraries has properly appreciated his endeavor (M  
343; S V 1  14, 353). H e contends that “there is n ot on e single co n tem p o ­
rary w h o  is qualified to review  [his] w ork ” and argues that even those w h o  
sit d ow n  and try to offer a m ore detailed analysis on ly  arrive at the m ost 
superficial o f  readings:
E ven  i f  so m eo n e  considerably better in form ed  takes it u p o n  h im se lf  to  
w ant to say som eth in g  about m e and m y task, it actually does n o t am ount 
to  anyth ing m ore than that he, after a superficial glance at m y w ork , q u ick ­
ly  finds som e earlier som eth in g  or o ther that he declares to  be com parable.
In this w ay it still does n o t am oun t to anything. S o m eth in g  o n  w h ich  a 
person  w ith  m y leisure, m y d iligence, m y talents, m y e d u c a tio n .. .has spent 
n o t o n ly  fourteen  years but essentially his entire life, the o n ly  th in g  for 
w h ich  h e has lived  and breathed— then  that so m e pastor, at m ost a profes­
sor, w o u ld  n o t n eed  m ore than a superficial glance at it in  order to  evalu­
ate it, that is surely absurd (M  3 4 3 -3 4 4 ; S V t  14, 3 5 4 , trans. m od ified ).
In the face o f  all the pastors and theologians w h o  claim  to find all sorts o f  
things that are analogous to his task, Kierkegaard declares that “a m ore care-
fui inspection” by them  w ou ld  reveal that there is n oth in g  analogous w ith ­
in Christianity— and then adds, “but this is w hat [they do] n ot find w orth  
the trouble” (Af 344; SV 1  14, 3 54 -355 ).
Kierkegaard wants us to be better readers than he thinks his co n tem ­
poraries have b een , to take the trouble to give his w ork  that “m ore care­
ful insp ection ” he claims it requires; and he encourages us to carry ou t this 
activity in  the light o f  his suggestion that his task is a Socratic task. B ut this 
is n ot to say that w e should exp ect such an inspection  to be an easy one. 
If Kierkegaard is right and n on e o f  his contem poraries has understood  h im  
and his task, w h y  should w e think that it w ill necessarily fare any better in  
our ow n  case? Kierkegaard is a strange, som ew hat hybrid figure. H e  pres­
ents h im self as a Socrates, som eon e skilled in the art o f  indirection  and so 
seem ingly forever elusive; and yet he dem ands that w e try to understand  
him  and offers us tools to assist us in  our attem pt. A n yone w h o  embarks 
on  such an enterprise should be w arned up front that she is repeatedly 
likely to encou n ter m om ents o f  seem ing clarity and a kind o f  shared 
intim acy w ith  Kierkegaard (this m ost personal o f  philosophers), fo llow ed  
by m om ents o f  utter incom prehension  and the anxiety that he is far 
to o  profound a character for our m ore lim ited  sensibilities. Trying to  
bring Kierkegaard into  focus can often seem  akin to w hat it is like w h en  
on e encounters irony in a text or m eets face to face w ith  an ironist her­
self:
Just as irony has som eth in g  d eterring about it, it likew ise has som eth in g  
extraordinarily seductive and fascinating about it. Its m asquerading and  
m ysteriousness, the telegraphic com m u n ica tio n  it prom pts because an iro­
nist always has to be u nd erstood  at a distance, the in fin ite sym pathy it pre­
supposes, the fleeting  but indescribable instant o f  understanding that is 
im m ediately  superseded by the anxiety  o f  m isunderstanding— all this holds 
o n e  prisoner in  inextricab le bonds ( C l  4 8 -4 9 ; S K S  1 ,1 0 9 ) .42
Som etim es w e w ill feel certain w e have gotten  hold  o f  Kierkegaard, on ly  
in the next m om en t to have the familiar experience o f  having h im  slip 
away yet again. D esp ite these difficulties, I remain con vinced  that there is 
m uch to be gained from taking Kierkegaard up on  his suggestion that w e  
v iew  his activity as a w riter and thinker as a Socratic task. R eaders o f  “M y  
Task” w h o  share m y con viction  w ill be aware, however, that I have b een  
operating at a fairly general level o f  description in this paper. Kierkegaard s 
m ain claim  is that the refusal to call h im self a Christian is analogous to
Socrates’ stance o f  ignorance. H e claims that so adopted, this stance gives 
him  the ability to make his fe llow  citizens aware o f  a deeper sense in  w h ich  
they are not Christians, w h ile  also allow ing h im  at the same tim e to pur­
sue an authentic ethical and religious life.
W ith  Kierkegaard’s Socratic poin t o f  v iew  n o w  hopefu lly  before us, the 
next natural step w ou ld  be to turn to other texts in  the corpus in  order to  
consider further h o w  Kierkegaard conceives o f  w hat he calls his Socratic 
m eth od  and w here in the corpus w e should lo o k  i f  w e  w ant to discover 
concrete exam ples o f  this m eth od  actually at w ork. B ut that w ill have to  
wait for another occasion .43 Let m e close by n oting  that there is perhaps a 
touch  o f  irony in Kierkegaard’s suggestion that it is on ly  the activity o f  
Socrates that sheds any m eaningful light on  his ow n  activity. For Socrates, 
o f  all people, is about as enigm atic and elusive a character as w e can find  
w ith in  philosophy, and is the very person w h o m  Alcibiades claims is utter­
ly unlike any other hum an being:
[Socrates] is unique; he is like n o  o n e  else in  the past and n o  o n e  in  the pres­
ent— this is by far the m ost am azing th in g  about h im ... .[H e ]  is so bizarre, 
his ways and his ideas are so unusual, that, search as y o u  m ight, y o u ’ll never  
find anyone else, alive or dead, w h o ’s even  rem ote ly  like h im .T h e  best you  
can do is n o t to  com pare h im  to anyth ing hum an, but to  liken  h im , as I do, 
to  Silenus and the satyrs__ 44
If Kierkegaard’s claim  bears out, then a proper investigation o f  his writings 
w ill reveal that Alcibiades was mistaken in his claim  about Socrates’ unique­
ness by on e person. W h en  investigating further Kierkegaard’s claim  that 
Socrates provides his on ly  analogy and that his task is a Socratic task, it’s 
w orth  keeping in m ind that Kierkegaard devoted  the bulk o f  his first 
mature w ork, The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates, to  
developing an account o f  w h o  he thinks Socrates is. D esp ite the prom i­
nence given in the title to the con cept o f  irony, Kierkegaard spends nearly 
three quarters o f  his discussion exam ining the very individual he w ill later 
m odel h im self upon  and toward w h o m  he n o w  points us.45 In this way 
Kierkegaard brings us full circle from  his last words in “M y Task” to the first 
words o f  his dissertation. H is first true act as a w riter and thinker was to 
stake his claim  as the best interpreter o f  Socrates; in the end o f  his life he 
maintains that i f  w e want to b ecom e interpreters o f  h im  w h o  avoid the 
superficial readings he attributes to his contem poraries, then w e should  
take his suggestion and exam ine his w ritings in  the light o f  Socrates. In
effect Kierkegaard suggests that on e riddle, the riddle o f  Socrates (w hich  he 
on ce thought he had solved in his dissertation and w h ich  continued  to  
occupy h im  throughout his life), is the key to our trying to solve a second  
riddle, the riddle o f  Søren Kierkegaard.46
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ument” that “must be assigned a preeminent place when the purely Socratic is sought” (Cl 16; SKS 
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19. The one exception being perhaps the young men who follow Socrates around and who enjoy lis­
tening to him examine those reputed to be wise. Kierkegaard does not present himself as someone 
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Socrates faces when seeking to interact with them. See, e.g., his discussion of Alcibiades at Cl 47- 
52, SKS 1,108-113; Cl 187-192, SKS 1,234-239; Philosophical Fragments [PF\, edited and translat­
ed by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985, 24, SKS 
4,231-232;JP  4:4300 (p. 221), Pap. XI.l A 428.
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ras as he is portrayed in Plato’s Protagoras (see, e.g., Cl 33, SKS 1, 94-95; Cl 52-62, SKS 1, 113- 
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pretentious and hollow rhetoric we have perverse and fallacious dialectic” (pp. 343,334). Sidgwick 
further calls into question the legitimacy of assimilating Callicles and Thrasymachus (open defend-
ers of an egoistic moral skepticism) to the first group of Sophists. It may be worth noting, howev­
er, that this latter claim seems partly to rest on Sidgwick’s being under the impression that Plato 
does not portray Protagoras as someone Socrates attacks because his doctrines are “novel or dan­
gerous” but only because they are “superficial and commonplace,” a view Kierkegaard surely would 
not be alone in rejecting (p. 360; cf. Plato, Meno, 9le).
21. It should be noted, however, that one dissimilarity between the pastors and theologians under crit­
icism by Kierkegaard and the Sophists of Socrates’ day is that while the former are part of the offi­
cial establishment and as such were generally recognized as legitimate authorities, the latter were 
usually outsiders who traveled to Athens and who were often viewed with considerable suspicion 
by those in power. Cf. Anytus’ discussion of the Sophists in Plato’s Meno (91b-92c).
22. At the close of “My Task,” Kierkegaard addresses the common man (menige Mand) and warns him 
to “avoid the pastors, avoid them, those abominations whose job is to hinder you in even becom­
ing aware of what true Christianity is and thereby to turn you, muddled by gibberish and illusion, 
into what they understand by a true Christian, a contributing member of the state Church, the 
national Church, and the like. Avoid them; only see to it that you willingly and promptly pay them 
the money they are to have. One must at no price have money differences with someone one 
scorns, lest it be said that one was avoiding them in order to get out of paying. No, pay them dou­
ble so that your disagreement with them can become obvious: that what concerns them does not 
concern you at all, money, and that, on the contrary, what does not concern them concerns you 
infinitely, Christianity” (M 347; SV1 14, 357).
23. In the Apology Socrates makes clear that independent of any danger the Sophists may represent, he 
takes it to be the case that the Athenian populace as a whole (which after all, in the form of the 
jury, will put him to death) is itself a significant force: “Do not be angry with me for speaking the 
truth; no man will survive who genuinely opposes you or any other crowd and prevents the occur­
rence of many unjust and illegal happenings in the city. A man who really fights for justice must 
lead a private, not a public, life if he is to survive for even a short time” (Ap . 31e-32a). In Plato’s 
Republic, this topic of the relationship between the individual Sophists and the larger Athenian soci­
ety is returned to: “Do you agree with the general opinion that certain young people are actually 
corrupted by sophists—that there are certain sophists with significant influence on the young who 
corrupt them through private teaching? Isn’t it rather the very people who say this who are the 
greatest sophists of all...? ....Not one of those paid private teachers, whom the people call 
sophists..., teaches anything other than the convictions that the majority express when they are 
gathered together. Indeed, these are precisely what the sophists call wisdom. It’s as if someone were 
learning the moods and appetites of a huge, strong beast that he’s rearing—how to approach and 
handle it, when it is most difficult to deal with or most gentle and what makes it so, what sounds 
it utters in either condition, and what sounds soothe or anger it. Having learned all this through 
tending the beast over a period of time, he calls this knack wisdom, gathers his information togeth­
er as if it were a craft, and starts to teach it. In truth, he knows nothing about which of these con­
victions is fine or shameful, good or bad, just or unjust, but applies all these names in accordance 
with how the beast reacts—calling what it enjoys good and what angers it bad” (492a-493c).
24. Thus refusing to call himself a Christian is, in part, an expression of Kierkegaard’s religious con­
victions and may be tied to his idea that one never is a Christian in this life, though each person 
certainly can embark on the lifelong task of becoming a Christian.
25. The Danish verb phrase “indbilde sig” can also mean to be under an illusion or under a delusion. 
Those who are under the illusion that they already are something will not be in the practice of
examining whether they really are that, nor will they set about trying to become something that they 
think they already are.
26. Kierkegaard frequently characterizes his task in terms of these two dimensions, so that one and the 
same activity is partly constitutive of what in his own case he takes to be an authentic life while 
also being directed at helping others to gain a greater awareness of the lack of fit between their 
avowed commitments and how they actually live. As a result, he argues that his method of approach 
has an intrinsic worth to it independent of how successful it is with his interlocutors, since it helps 
constitute his own life whether or not, in the end, it manages to make the others more aware:“That 
is why this approach has intrinsic worth. Ordinarily it holds true that an approach has worth only 
in proportion to what is achieved by it. One judges and condemns, makes a big noise—this has no 
intrinsic worth, but one reckons on achieving a great deal thereby. It is different with the approach 
described here. Assume that a person had devoted his whole life to using it, assume that he had 
practiced it all his life, and assume that he had achieved nothing—he nevertheless has by no means 
lived in vain,because his life was true self-denial” (PV44; S V t 13,532-533; cf. CUP277-278; SKS 
7,251-254).
27. Ap. 31a.The idea that a philosophers primary role is to serve as a gadfly for her fellow citizens is 
rather removed from how philosophy tends to be thought of these days. Reminding ourselves that 
Socrates thought of his philosophical activity in these terms will better position us to appreciate 
the sense in which Kierkegaard might readily call himself a philosopher in spite of his general ten­
dency to ridicule and set himself against most modern forms of philosophy.
28. Socrates’ ignorance has remained an enduring source of puzzlement; this is especially so for 
philosophers since ignorance is normally thought to be a condition that philosophy helps one to 
overcome. It might seem that insofar as Socrates remains ignorant he lies outside the proper 
province of philosophy. One might even feel like asserting, “If Socrates is still ignorant after seven­
ty years isn’t this reason enough to admit that his method is inadequate at best and ultimately a fail­
ure?” In his essay, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” Gregory Vlastos nicely captures this senti­
ment and brings into view the seemingly inherent tension between Socrates’ unvarying stance of 
ignorance and his presentation of himself as a virtuous person: “If after decades of searching 
Socrates remained convinced that he still knew nothing, would not further searching have become 
a charade— or rather worse? For he holds that virtue ‘is’ knowledge: if he has no knowledge, his 
life is a disaster, he has missed out on virtue and, therewith, on happiness. How is it then that he is 
serenely confident he has achieved both? [In a footnote to this passage:] His avowals of epistemic 
inadequacy, frequent in the dialogues, are never paralleled by admission of moral failure; the asym­
metry is striking” (in Socratic Studies, ed., Myles Burnyeat, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1994, pp. 39-66, p. 43). Socrates’ stance of ignorance is sometimes treated as a rhetorical device that 
he uses to draw out his interlocutor. Norman Gulley, e.g., claims that Socrates’ profession of igno­
rance is “an expedient to encourage his interlocutor to seek out the truth, to make him think he 
is joining with Socrates in a voyage of discovery” (quoted by Vlastos, p. 39). Hence his stance of 
ignorance is sometimes called a mere ironic pose; consider this common dictionary definition of 
Socratic irony: “pretense of ignorance in a discussion to expose the fallacies in the opponent’s 
logic” (Webster's New World College Dictionary, 4th edition, ed., Michael Agnes, Cleveland, Wiley 
Publishing, 2002, p. 755). In the Repw6/ir,Thrasymachus is just as suspicious of Socrates’ claim to be 
ignorant, only he treats it as a tactic adopted by Socrates to avoid having to be questioned by oth­
ers: “By Heracles, [Thrasymachus] said, that’s just Socrates’ usual irony. I knew, and I said so to these 
people earlier, that you’d be unwilling to answer and that, if someone questioned you, you’d be
ironical and do anything rather than give an answer” (337a). In contrast to these positions 
Kierkegaard, who is best known for having argued in his dissertation that Socrates is an ironist 
through and through, never conceives of Socrates’ ignorance as feigned or merely tactical, as 
though it did not go all the way down. See, e.g., Cl 169-177, SKS 1, 217-224; Cl 269-271, SKS 
1,306-308. Among modern commentators who discuss Socrates’ irony, Alexander Nehamas seems 
to come closest to Kierkegaard’s position. Commenting on Vlastos’ discussion, he calls the rela­
tionship between Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge and his conviction that he has lived a virtuous 
life “Socrates’ final and most complex irony. He disavows the knowledge he himself considers nec­
essary for a life of aretê. But he is also ‘serenely’ confident in thinking that he has actually lived such 
a life.. ..[If we suppose] he did live a good life, does he or does he not think that he really has that 
knowledge? Does he or does he not mean his disavowal seriously?.. .Plato’s early works do not 
answer [these questions], and they thus endow Socrates with a further ironical dimension. Not just 
ironical with his interlocutors, he is ironical toward Plato himself (and so towards Plato’s readers) 
as well, for even Plato cannot answer the question Socrates poses for him.Though Socrates is Plato’s 
creature, his own literary character, he remains opaque to him: he is a character his own creator 
admits he cannot understand” (The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault [The Art of 
Living], Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998, pp. 86-87).
29. A passage in Plato’s Laches nicely brings out the connection between Socrates’ interest in what an 
individual knows and his deeper interest in examining how that person lives: “You don’t appear to 
me to know that whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and associates with him in con­
versation must necessarily, even if he began by conversing about something quite different in the 
first place, keep on being led about by the man’s arguments until he submits to answering ques­
tions about himself concerning both his present manner of life and the life he has lived hitherto. 
And when he does submit to this questioning, you don’t realize that Socrates will not let him go 
before he has well and truly tested every last detail” (187e-188a; cf. Ap. 29e-30a).
30. One definition of sophistry might be any approach to ethical and religious matters that fosters the 
illusion that a theoretical knowledge of such matters is possible independent of the practical under­
standing that one only acquires by living a certain kind of life. Kierkegaard believes that with the 
rise in his day of Hegelian philosophy a new species of sophistry is born, a sophistry that holds out 
the promise of a systematic, theoretical comprehension of ethical and religious matters while at the 
same time leading individuals to neglect the proper realm of ethics and religion: namely the indi­
vidual herself qua ethical and religious agent. Within Kierkegaard’s corpus, the main attack against 
this Hegelian species of sophistry is launched by the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus in 
his two books Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
31. Ap. 22e-23a; cf. 23c-24b and Plato, Theaetetus, 151c, where Socrates claims that “people have often 
before now got into such a state with me as to be literally ready to bite when I take away some 
nonsense or other from them.” Recall that in the Apology Socrates claims that his life as a philoso­
pher was given a certain impetus by the oracle’s claim that no one is wiser than he is. Socrates finds 
this a puzzling remark and treats it as a kind of riddle set him by the god. He doesn’t think he is 
an especially wise person but he also thinks he ought to take quite seriously the god’s pronounce­
ment. Accordingly, after remaining puzzled for quite a while, he reluctantly turns to what seems to 
come quite naturally to him, to the activity of questioning and refuting, thinking that in this way 
he might arrive at some kind of an answer to the god’s riddle. Socrates claims that he then pro­
ceeded to seek out people who were reputed to be wise, initially with the idea that he might dis­
cover someone who is wiser than he is. But we all know how the story goes. Instead of making
this kind of discovery, Socrates repeatedly encounters people who think they know things they do 
not and then tries to show this to the individuals in question. This does not always make him the 
most popular of individuals. Consider his description of his first such encounter, whose generic 
form nicely captures the basic type of exchange that he claims has led to a climate of hostility in 
which people have repeatedly slandered him: “When I examined this man...my experience was 
something like this: I thought that he appeared wise to many people and especially to himself, but 
he was not. I then tried to show him that he thought himself wise, but that he was not. As a result 
he came to dislike me, and so did many of the bystanders” (Ap. 21c-d). It is this condition of being 
“unpopular with many people” that Socrates says will lead to his “undoing, if [he] is undone, not 
Meletus or Anytus but the slanders and envy of many people” (Ap. 28a).
32. Given the inductive nature of Socrates’ enterprise, the strength of his convictions will partly rest 
on the quality of the interlocutor he encounters, providing him perhaps with further reason for 
trying to foster a philosophical culture in Athens in which someone might arise who could truly 
test him, a Socrates who could test Socrates (Plato arguably tries to fulfill that very role over the 
course of his writings): “These conclusions, at which we arrived earlier in our previous discussions 
are, I’d say, held down by arguments of iron and adamant, even if it’s rather rude to say so. So it 
would seem, anyhow. And if you [Callicles] or someone more forceful than you won’t undo them, 
then anyone who says anything other than what I’m now saying cannot be speaking well. And yet 
for my part, my account is ever the same: I don’t know how these things are, but no one I’ve ever 
met, as in this case, can say anything else without being ridiculous” (Grg. 508e-509a).This picture 
of Socrates being tested by others, however, remains somewhat of an anomaly within Plato’s cor­
pus; his fundamental role is to be the one who asks questions. In the Theaetetus Socrates notes that 
this is how he is commonly thought of and readily ties this view of him to his stance of ignorance: 
“The common reproach against me is that I am always asking questions of other people but never 
express my own views about anything, because there is no wisdom in me; and that is true enough. 
And the reason of it is this, that God compels me to attend to the travail of others, but has forbid­
den me to procreate. So that I am not in any sense a wise man; I cannot claim as the child of my 
own soul any discovery worth the name of wisdom” (150c-d).
33. In his dissertation Kierkegaard assigns Socrates an essential role in the development of a proper 
speculative philosophy, but contends that he should only be conceived of as someone who prepares 
the way for speculative philosophy without himself becoming a speculative philosopher: “In the
world-historical sense [Socrates’] significance was that he set the boat of speculation afloat__He
himself, however, does not go on board but merely launches the ship. He belongs to an older for­
mation, and yet a new one begins with him” (Cl 217; SKS 1,261, trans. modified).
34. On the idea of Socrates’ activity being a kind of preliminary cleansing of the soul, consider this 
passage from Plato’s Sophist: “They set out to get rid of the belief in one’s own wisdom in anoth­
er way. How? They cross-examine someone when he thinks he’s saying something though he’s say­
ing nothing. Then, since his opinions will vary inconsistently, these people will easily scrutinize 
him. They collect his opinions together during the discussion, put them side by side, and show that 
they conflict with each other at the same time on the same subjects in relation to the same things 
and in the same respects.The people who are being examined see this, get angry at themselves, and 
become calmer toward others [ideally speaking: cf. Ap. 23d]. They lose their inflated and rigid 
beliefs about themselves that way, and no loss is pleasanter to hear or has a more lasting effect on 
them. Doctors who work on the body think it can’t benefit from any food that’s offered to it until 
what’s interfering with it from inside is removed.The people who cleanse the soul, my young friend,
likewise think the soul, too, won’t get any advantage from any learning that’s offered to it until 
someone shames it by refuting it, removes the opinions that interfere with learning, and exhibits it 
cleansed, believing that it knows only those things that it does, and nothing more” (230b-d [italics 
mine]). By denying that Socrates’ life should be understood as incomplete, Kierkegaard radicalizes 
this activity of cleansing the soul, insisting that this activity is never finished, never perfected but 




37. Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author Anti-Climacus puts it this way:“Let us never forget—but how 
many ever really knew it or thought it?—let us never forget that Socrates’ ignorance was a kind of 
fear and worship of God, that his ignorance was the Greek version of the Jewish saying: The fear 
of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. Let us never forget that it was out of veneration for God 
that he was ignorant, that as far as it was possible for a pagan he was on guard duty as a judge on 
the frontier between God and man, keeping watch so that the deep gulf of qualitative difference between 
them was maintained, between God and man, that God and man did not merge in some way, philo- 
sophice, poetice [philosophically, poetically], etc., into one. That was why Socrates was the ignorant 
one, and that was why the deity found him to be the wisest of men” (The Sickness Unto Death, edit­
ed and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1980, 99; SV1 11,209-210 [underlining mine]).
38. Cf. two passages from Kierkegaard’s journals: “During the most developed period of the most intel­
lectual nation Socrates attained ignorance (ignorance, with which one [normally] begins in order 
to know more and more) and how? Because in radical ethicality he took his task to be that of pre­
serving himself in ignorance, so that no temptation without and no temptation within would ever 
trick him into admitting that he knew something, he who nevertheless in another sense did know 
something.. ..The significance of Socratic ignorance was precisely to keep ethics from becoming 
scholarly knowledge—instead of practice. There is nothing more dangerous than to transform into 
scholarly knowledge something which should be practiced” {JP 1:972 [p. 424], Pap. X .l A 360; JP 
4:3871 [p. 23], Pap. XI.2 A 362).
39. This also arguably marks a difference between Kierkegaard and Socrates, for however isolated 
Kierkegaard is he still has the image and example of Socrates to help him maintain his bearings. 
Personal outpourings of this sort also mark his writings as much more a product of modernity and 
the Christian tradition of confession than anything we find written about Socrates. The ancient 
accounts of Socrates don’t really concern themselves with what we might call Socrates’ inner life, 
and if as an experiment you were to try to imagine a sustained inner dialogue taking place within 
Socrates, I think you would quickly find the whole idea somewhat uncanny. In the Apology Socrates 
claims that he is the “same man” whether in public life or in private discussion: “Throughout my 
life, in any public activity I may have engaged in, I am the same man as I am in private life....If 
anyone says that.. .he heard anything privately that the others did not hear, be assured that he is not 
telling the truth” (32e-33b). Yet we often have the feeling when reading about him that there is 
more there, more to him than what lies open to us.This may partly be why we continue to be fas­
cinated by Plato’s version of Socrates in particular, who seems to have a hidden depth which is 
never brought fully out into the open. Alexander Nehamas nicely puts it this way: “Incomprehen­
sible and opaque, to his author as well as to us, Plato’s early Socrates has acquired a solidity and 
robustness few literary characters can match” (The Art of Living, p. 91). Yet Socrates’ opaqueness
often acts as a spur, seemingly encouraging us to probe further and inviting us to think that progress 
can be made in our quest to understand him. Alcibiades nicely captures this idea with his claim that 
Socrates is like a Silenus statue, ugly and grotesque on the outside, while hidden inside lie little stat­
ues of the gods: “I’m going to show you what [Socrates] really is. To begin with, he’s crazy about 
beautiful boys; he constantly follows them around in a perpetual daze. Also, he likes to say he’s igno­
rant and knows nothing. Isn’t this just like Silenus? O f course it is! And all this is just on the sur­
face, like the outsides of those statues of Silenus. I wonder, my fellow drinkers, if you have any idea 
what a sober and temperate man he proves to be once you have looked inside. Believe me, it could­
n’t matter less to him whether a boy is beautiful. You can’t imagine how little he cares whether a 
person is beautiful, or rich, or famous in any other way that most people admire. He considers all 
these possessions beneath contempt, and that’s exactly how he considers all of us as well. In pub­
lic, I tell you, his whole life is one big game— a game of irony. I don’t know if any of you have seen 
him when he’s really serious. But I once caught him when he was open like Silenus’ statues, and I 
had a glimpse of the figures he keeps hidden within: they were so godlike— so bright and beauti­
ful, so utterly amazing—that I no longer had a choice— I just had to do whatever he told me” 
(Plato, Symposium [Smp.], 216d-217a). O f course, we all know that Alcibiades did not turn out so 
well (did not “do whatever [Socrates] told [him]”).This fact, together with Socrates’ claim to be 
the same person both in public and private, casts doubt on whether Alcibiades is entirely clear 
when he attempts to draw a distinction between Socrates’ outward stance of irony and his suppos­
edly more serious inward condition. Kierkegaard discusses Alcibiades’ claim to have glimpsed what 
lies within Socrates at Cl 50-51; SKS 1,111-112.
40. Kierkegaard would not dispute this. In The Point of View he says he does not place a lot of stock in
the mere fact that an author claims that her book has such and such significance:“! do not.. .think 
much of assurances in connection with literary productions and am accustomed to take a com­
pletely objective attitude to my own. If in the capacity of a third party, as a reader, I cannot sub­
stantiate from the writings that what I am saying [qua author] is the case,.. .it could never occur to 
me to want to win [by assurances] what I thus consider lost [with respect to the texts them­
selves]__qua author it does not help very much that I qua human being make assurances that I
have intended this and that” (P V 33; SV1 13, 524, trans. modified).
41. But in doing so Kierkegaard clearly is not an easy act to follow; he seems to do everything so well 
himself. He composes intricate, existentially challenging texts and then proceeds to develop pow­
erful tools for reading and interpreting those texts. Anyone who wants to develop her own read­
ing must learn to be guided by his remarks without turning them into dogma, following them as 
long they keep the texts fresh and alive while not being afraid to jettison them when they seem to 
drain the texts of their vitality.
42. And to seek such an understanding, as I do, while inviting others to accompany one is to run the 
further risk of having one’s moments of misunderstanding very much on display. As Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus puts it, “Anyone who begins to exercise himself in this 
understanding no doubt will frequently enough catch himself in a misunderstanding, and if he 
wants to become involved with others, he had better take care” (PF 102; SKS 4, 299).
43. See note 9.
44. Smp. 221c-d.
45. Kierkegaard focuses on Socrates in all of Part One of the dissertation and in Part Two in the sec­
ond half of the chapter entitled “The World-Historical Validity of Irony, the Irony of Socrates” (Cl 
7-237, SKS 1,69-278; Cl 264-271, SKS 1,302-308). In the introduction to Part Two, Kierkegaard
claims that he has “dealt in the first part of the dissertation solely with Socrates” (Cl 241; SKS 1, 
281). Kierkegaards dissertation director, Frederik Christian Sibbern, suggested that he change the 
title of his dissertation to “Socrates as Ironist with a Contribution to the Development of the Con­
cept of Irony in General, Particularly with Regard to the Most Recent Times” (quoted in Olesen, 
“Kierkegaards Socratic Hermeneutic,” p. 103; see also SKS K l, 134; Bruce Kirmmse,“Socrates in 
the Fast Lane: Kierkegaards The Concept of Irony on the University sVelocifere (Documents, Con­
text, Commentary, and Interpretation)” in The Concept of Irony (International Kierkegaard Commen­
tary, vol. 2), ed., Robert L. Perkins, Macon, Georgia, Mercer University Press, 2001, pp. 17-99, p. 
23).
46. Thanks to Bridget Clarke, Ben Eggleston, Robert Haraldsson, Brian Soderquist and Jon Stewart 
for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
